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SUMMARY
High-profile complaints about so-called Dutch disease have led many to question if industry in some
parts of the country is suffering due to the success of the natural resources sector in others. This paper
considers changes in manufacturing employment from 2002- 2008, a time of increased commodity
prices. At first glance, the figures appear alarming — Canada shed 328,000 manufacturing jobs during
that period — but the decline wasn’t entirely commodity-driven. Canada is the sole G-7 country in which
manufacturing is on par with what it was 40 years ago; manufacturing employment rose in the decade
prior to the decline thanks to government austerity, which spurred monetary easing, making industry
more export-competitive. Much of the contraction from 2002-2008 was a natural reaction to this
unsustainable situation. Higher commodity prices in the same period actually had a benign — if not
positive — effect on Canada’s manufacturing industry, notwithstanding the fall in employment. The
manufacturing jobs that were lost were typically low paying, and were offset by the creation of better-
paying employment in other sectors. The available data on gross employment flows suggest that the
disruptions associated with the shift of employment out of manufacturing were surprisingly small. The
reduction in employment was largely achieved through attrition; layoff rates held steady while hiring
rates fell. Moreover, the data are not consistent with fears that the manufacturing sector was hollowed
out. Research and development activities held steady and investment in new technology continued to
grow, leaving the manufacturing sector healthier in 2008 than it was in 2002.  
† The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.   
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RÉSUMÉ
La grogne largement médiatisée sur ce qu’on a appelé le mal hollandais a conduit bien des gens à se demander 
si l’industrie, dans certaines régions du pays, ne faisait pas les frais de la réussite du secteur des ressources 
naturelles dans d’autres régions. Cet article porte sur les mutations dans la situation de l’emploi du secteur 
manufacturier entre 2002 et 2008, au moment où les prix des produits de base étaient à la hausse. À première 
vue, les chiffres semblent alarmants – le Canada a perdu 328 000 emplois dans ce secteur au cours de cette 
période, mais le déclin n’était pas entièrement attribuable aux prix des produits de base. Le Canada est le 
seul pays du G7 où le secteur manufacturier est dans un état comparable à ce qu’il était 40 ans auparavant; 
le nombre des emplois a augmenté au cours de la décennie qui a précédé le déclin en raison de l’austérité 
gouvernementale qui a contribué à l’assouplissement de la politique monétaire et permis à l’industrie d’être 
plus compétitive sur le plan des exportations. Dans une large part, le ralentissement entre 2002 et 2008 
résultait naturellement de cette situation intenable. En fait, le prix à la hausse des produits de base durant 
la même période a eu très peu d’effet – sinon un effet positif – sur l’industrie manufacturière du Canada, 
malgré la perte d’emplois mal payés qui ont été remplacés par des emplois mieux rémunérés dans d’autres 
secteurs. Les données disponibles sur les taux bruts d’emploi indiquent que les perturbations liées à la baisse 
des emplois dans le secteur de la fabrication ont été étonnamment faibles. C’est l’usure des effectifs qui 
est en grande partie responsable de cette baisse tandis que les taux de licenciements demeuraient stables 
et que l’embauche chutait. De plus, les données semblent infirmer les craintes selon lesquelles le secteur 
manufacturier aurait été éviscéré. Les activités de recherche et de développement sont demeurées stables et 
l’investissement dans les nouvelles technologies a continué de croître, si bien que le secteur manufacturier se 
portait mieux en 2008 qu’en 2002.
† 
L’auteur tient à exprimer sa reconnaissance envers des lecteurs qui désirent conserver l’anonymat, pour leurs commentaires 
utiles.
WAS DUTCH DISEASE A BLESSING?  
A popular description of Dutch disease takes the following form: when the prices of resources
increase, the exchange rates of resource-exporting countries appreciate. This increase in the
exchange rate makes other exports less competitive on world markets, and results in a loss of
output and employment in these sectors — notably manufacturing.1 The surge in the prices of
oil and commodities that began in 2002 has led to a significant restructuring of the Canadian
economy, and one of the most widely discussed elements of this transformation is the shrinking
of the Canadian manufacturing sector. Between 2002 and 2008, manufacturing employment fell
by 328,000, from 2.29 million (15 per cent of total employment) to 1.96 million (11.5 per cent
of all jobs). 
These losses are, on the face of it, cause for concern. Firstly, the dislocations incurred during the
transition away from manufacturing are costly in themselves. And even if employment in other
sectors increases, those gains may not be enough to offset the jobs lost in manufacturing — and
wages in the manufacturing sector are typically higher than those in the rest of the economy. In
the longer term, there is the risk that the manufacturing sector will be hollowed out and unable
to expand again if — as has always been the case in the past — commodity prices fall.
This article argues that these concerns are, for the most part, overstated and not consistent with
the evidence. The transition of employment out of manufacturing was largely achieved by
attrition, and job creation in other sectors more than offset those losses. The shift out of
manufacturing was also accompanied by an increase in real wages, both in the economy as a
whole and in the manufacturing sector; the jobs that were lost were generally low paying. The
Canadian manufacturing sector of 2008 employed fewer workers than in 2002, but it paid higher
wages, and the stock of hi-tech machinery and equipment available to those workers had
increased. Moreover, manufacturing employment in research and development increased during
this time. The term Dutch disease is a misnomer; the Canadian manufacturing sector was
arguably healthier in 2008 than it was in 2002.
THE MECHANICS OF DUTCH DISEASE
The Dutch disease story is essentially one of how the economy adjusts to an increase in the
foreign demand for the output of one sector. Suppose for simplicity that there are only two
sectors: resources and manufacturing. An increase in the demand for Canadian resource exports
increases the demand for labour and hence wages in that sector; these higher wages attract
workers from the manufacturing sector. This reduction in the supply of manufacturing workers
produces upward pressures on wages, even as the increased labour supply brings wages down in
the resources sector. This transfer of workers from manufacturing to the resource sector will
continue as long as there are higher wages to be had in the resource sector, and will stop when
wages in the two sectors are equalized.
1 The effects of the exchange rate appreciation on the manufacturing sector are not uniformly negative. The stronger
Canadian dollar made it easier for manufacturing firms to increase purchases of imported capital equipment, as noted
in a later section. 
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Descriptions of Dutch disease often focus attention on the role of nominal exchange rates, but
the exchange rate is part of the transmission mechanism, not the underlying cause of the
sectoral shift. Higher foreign demand for Canadian resource exports will lead to an increase in
the real exchange rate, either by an increase in the nominal exchange rate or by an increase in
the price level. This real appreciation is part of the market signal to shift productive resources
out of the manufacturing sector. Under a flexible exchange rate, manufacturing exporters
become less competitive as the value of the currency appreciates. Under a fixed exchange rate,
the increased inflow of capital produces inflationary pressures and manufacturing exporters
become less competitive as their costs increase.
A fixed exchange rate would not prevent Dutch disease; monetary policy doesn’t affect the
relative price changes that drive sectoral shifts. Canada has had a long experience with
commodity price cycles. The difficulties in maintaining a fixed exchange rate in the face of
sharp changes in resource process led the Bank of Canada to abandon the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates in the 1950s.2 Exchange rate appreciations also affect resource
exporters, so flexible exchange rates play a key role in moderating the effects of a surge in
commodity prices.
INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The reduction in Canadian manufacturing employment between 2002 and 2008 was not an
event unique to Canada, or to the period 2002-2008. Manufacturing employment in
industrialized counties has been falling for decades (Figure 1), and this trend predates the
arrival of Chinese manufacturers on world markets. Indeed, Canada is the only G-7 country in
which manufacturing employment is on a par with what it was 40 years ago. From an
international perspective, the question isn’t so much, why has Canadian manufacturing
employment fallen? It is why has Canadian manufacturing employment resisted the global
downward trend?
FIGURE 1: MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
Data source: FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
2 For a review of this episode, see Schembri, Lawrence (2008). “Canada’s experience with a flexible exchange rate in
the 1950s: Valuable lessons learned,” Bank of Canada Review, Spring 2008: 3-15.
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3The post-2002 decline should also be put in context with the increase in manufacturing
employment over the preceding 10 years. Part of the increase immediately after 1992 can be
attributed to the recovery from the 1990-92 recession, but the sustained growth in Canadian
manufacturing employment through the rest of the decade was a phenomenon unmatched in
other industrialized countries. 
The deficit-cutting efforts on the parts of both the federal and provincial governments in the
latter half of the 1990s induced a significant fiscal policy contraction, and the Bank of Canada
compensated by relaxing monetary policy. In the two years following the federal
governments’s 1995 austerity budget, the Bank of Canada reduced its policy rate by more than
five percentage points, and this monetary easing contributed to the continuing depreciation of
the Canadian dollar, which reached a historical low in 2002 (Figure 2). This depreciation made
Canadian exporters more competitive on world markets, and particularly manufacturing
exporters; commodity exporters faced weak prices in the latter part of the 1990s. (Weak
commodity prices were of course another important contributor to the 1990s depreciation.)
FIGURE 2: CANADIAN EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
Data source: Bank of International Settlements
The grandfather fallacy is the tendency to look only at the change from a given starting point,
and not the starting point itself. The global trend toward reduced employment in manufacturing
had been reversed in Canada by a combination of the Bank of Canada’s attempt to offset a
fiscal contraction and by record-low commodity prices. Both were transitory events.
Government spending resumed its usual pace once deficits were under control, and commodity
prices would eventually stop falling. So before examining the Dutch disease episode of 2002-
2008, it is important to note that the situation that prevailed in 2002 was in many ways
exceptional and unsustainable.
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WAGES AND THE SHIFT OUT OF MANUFACTURING
Employment dominates the debate about Dutch disease, but wages are the driving factor
behind the shifts in employment out of the manufacturing sector. As noted earlier, the sectoral
shifts model predicts that the reduction in employment in manufacturing is caused by workers
leaving that sector and taking higher-paying work in the expanding sectors.
Real wage growth was anemic through the 1990s (Figure 3), and the loss in purchasing power
induced by the 20 per cent depreciation in the value of the Canadian dollar during the decade
was a contributing factor. The only period of significant wage growth over the past 30 years
was during the shift out of manufacturing. This seems paradoxical; how can job losses in a
high-wage sector result in an increase in the national average? The explanation is that the lost
manufacturing jobs were, for the most part, lower-paying jobs.
FIGURE 3: REAL HOURLY WAGES OF FULL-TIME WORKERS AGED 17 TO 64
Source: Morissette et al, (2012)
Figure 4 graphs the distribution for hourly wages in 2002 and 2008, expressed in 2012 dollars.
The lost manufacturing jobs were generally concentrated where wages are lowest. The number
of jobs paying $35/hour or more was largely unchanged between 2002 and 2008. More than 60
per cent of the manufacturing jobs lost paid less than $19.05/hour — the median wage in 2002.
So even though average and median wages in the manufacturing sector were and remained
higher than in the economy as a whole, the reduction in manufacturing employment
contributed to general increases in wages in the economy as a whole. 
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FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF REAL HOURLY EARNINGS: MANUFACTURING
The lost manufacturing jobs were typically those that paid low wages, as the sectoral shift
model would predict. The net result of these employment shifts was a generalised acceleration
in the rate of growth of real wages. Real median hourly wages in the manufacturing sector
grew at an average rate of 0.27 per cent a year between 1981 and 2002,3 and this growth rate
doubled to 0.54 per cent a year between 2002 and 2008.  
The sectoral shift model also predicts that the new jobs created in the expanding sector will be
better paying than those lost in the declining sector. Figure 5 reproduces the exercise performed
in Figure 4 for the non-manufacturing sector4 and illustrates several important differences
compared to the changes observed in manufacturing. The first is — perhaps not surprisingly —
that employment in the non-manufacturing sector increased between 2002 and 2008. These new
jobs were, for the most part, relatively well-paid; 75 per cent of the jobs behind the net increase
in non-manufacturing employment paid more than the 2002 median wage.
3 Calculated using the data provided by Morissette, René, Garnett Picot and Yuqian Lu (2012). “Wage growth over the
past 30 years: Changing wages by age and education,” Economic Insights (8), June 2012, Statistics Canada, and the
LFS data after 1998.
4 The resource sector was not the only industry to benefit from the increase in commodity process: associated
industries such as construction, transportation and related services would have also benefited.
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FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF REAL HOURLY EARNINGS: NON-MANUFACTURING
TABLE 1: CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, 2002-2008 (THOUSANDS OF WORKERS)
Another concern of the Dutch disease story is that the number of lost manufacturing jobs may
not be completely replaced by gains in other sectors, even if the wages offered by the
expanding sectors are higher. These fears do not seem to be consistent with recent Canadian
experience — total employment grew faster than the working-age population. The employment
rate5 increased from 61.7 per cent in 2002 to 63.5 per cent in 2008 — the highest level ever
observed in Canada.
The net result of the shift of jobs out of the manufacturing sector on wages was largely
positive: mainly low-paying jobs were lost, and these losses were more than offset by mainly
higher-paying jobs in other sectors.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRANSFERS
Transitions of any kind involve some level of disruption, but the sectoral-shifts model predicts
that job losses in the manufacturing sector should be relatively pain-free. Instead of layoffs, the
reduction in manufacturing employment would be brought about by workers leaving the sector 
5 The employment rate is the share of working-age people who are in employment.
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Hourly wage
(2012 dollars) Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Total
0-10 -49.4 -222.2 -262.2
10-15 -103.7 432.5 324.6
15-20 -57.6 394.7 337.0
20-25 -69.2 293.3 222.3
25-30 -12.3 344.4 332.4
30-35 -44.6 179.7 132.2
35- 8.4 695.4 703.1
Total -328.3 2 117.8 1 789.5
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in search of higher wages elsewhere. This section focuses on the mechanics of the decline in
manufacturing employment. Did workers jump, or were they pushed?
The relationship between net and gross employment flows is determined by the following identity:
Change in employment = hires – layoffs – quits
There are no comprehensive Canadian data for gross employment flows,6 but Tapp notes that
the Public Use Microdata Files of the Labour Force Survey are nonetheless a rich source of
information about the labour force transitions relevant for the matter at hand.7
• Layoffs: The number of people in a given month who are unemployed, who report
unemployment durations of four weeks or less and who report being laid off as the reason
why they are unemployed.
• Job leavers: The number of people in a given month who are unemployed, who report
unemployment durations of four weeks or less and who left their previous employment of
their own accord. 
• Hires: The number of people in a given month who are in employment and who report job
tenures of one month.
The monthly numbers display significant seasonal patterns, so the discussion here is based on
the 12-month moving averages.
The scale of the gross flows in and out of employment is an order of magnitude greater than
the net flows that are the focus of most analyses. The net loss of 328,000 manufacturing jobs
between 2002 and 2008 should be put in the context of a labour market in which more than
30,000 manufacturing workers report being laid off in an average month (Figure 6).
FIGURE 6: MANUFACTURING SECTOR LAYOFFS
Data source: Labour Force Survey, Public Use Microdata Files
6 The data used here cannot identify transitions from one job to another, or transitions between being in employment
and being out of the labour force. 
7 Stephen Tapp, 2011. “Lost in transition: the costs and consequences of sectoral labour adjustment,” Canadian Journal
of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1264-1296, November.
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Layoffs in manufacturing are volatile and closely related to the business cycle; not surprisingly,
layoffs increased sharply during the recessions of 1990-92 and 2008-09. But the Dutch disease
period does not appear to be characterised by a noticeably large surge in layoffs. Layoff rates
during 2002-2008 were generally lower than those recorded when manufacturing employment
was increasing during the latter half of the 1990s. This pattern is consistent with the sectoral
shifts story. If the reduction in manufacturing had been due to a reduction in the demand for
labour, we would have expected to see an increase in layoffs and layoff rates as in 1990-92 and
2008-09.8
While job leavers are too few9 to have a significant effect on changes in employment, they are
a useful indicator of the (perceived) strength of the job market. When labour demand is strong,
workers who are unhappy with their current employment are more likely to quit in the
expectation of finding a better job. But if jobs are scarce, workers will be more reluctant to
leave the security of the job they have. Job-leaving patterns are also closely related to the
business cycle (Figure 7); job-leaving rates decline sharply during recessions. If job-leaving
rates are a measure of workers’ confidence in their ability to find a better job than the one they
currently hold, then the Dutch disease period was one in which manufacturing workers
generally had more faith in the labour market than they did in the 1990s, when manufacturing
employment was increasing.
FIGURE 7: MANUFACTURING SECTOR JOB LEAVERS
Data source: Labour Force Survey, Public Use Microdata Files
8 Even if layoff rates declined for manufacturing workers as a whole, it still might have been the case that the most
vulnerable workers were more likely to lose their jobs. A breakdown of layoff patterns suggests that this is not the
case. Layoff rates fell for workers without a post-secondary certificate or diploma, as well as for workers with job
tenures less than five years. Layoff rates for longer-tenure workers and for those with post-secondary credentials
remained steady.
9 It should be noted that this group does not include people who quit their jobs and left the labour force.
8
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
Pe
r c
en
t
Job leavers: left-hand scale Job leaver rate: right-hand scale
Probably the most important factor driving the reduction in manufacturing was the decline in
hiring graphed in Figure 8.10 The pace of hiring slows noticeably during the Dutch disease
period compared to the rates observed in the latter part of the 1990s. Figure 9 suggests that this
slowdown in hiring did not result in significantly higher levels or rates of manufacturing sector
unemployment.11
FIGURE 8: MANUFACTURING SECTOR: HIRES
Data source: Labour Force Survey, Public Use Microdata Files
FIGURE 9: UNEMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Data source: Cansim Table 282−0094
10 The data in Figure 7 start in 1998. An apparent data redefinition in 1997 makes comparisons problematic. The raw
data show an implausibly sharp fall in hiring in January 1997, followed by numbers comparable with the new level.
The data in CANSIM series V2085354 —manufacturing workers with job tenures of one to three months— do not
display this sudden drop, but do have features similar to those graphed in Figure 7 after 1998.
11 Unemployed manufacturing workers are those who are unemployed and whose last employment was in the
manufacturing sector.
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If the principal explanation for the reduction in manufacturing employment was a reduction in
the demand for labour, we would have expected to see more evidence of disruption than is
visible in the data. The decline seems to have been brought about by attrition. Gross
employment flows out of the sector remained at their usual levels, but a larger proportion of
these losses were not replaced.
HOLLOWING-OUT
There have always been cycles in manufacturing employment, but with each downturn worries
are expressed that the reduction is so drastic that the sector will not be able to bounce back.
The reduction in employment does not justify those fears. The jobs that were lost were
generally low paying and Canada is still the only G-7 country where manufacturing
employment is roughly the same as it was 40 years ago. 
Krugman12 posits a learning-by-doing model, in which the increasing returns that produce
technical progress when a sector is expanding work in reverse when the sector is contracting. A
sector that is shrinking becomes even less productive, and will eventually disappear altogether.
Subsequent work on the economics of technical change has put emphasis on research and
development (R&D), and in particular on the increasing returns that result from knowledge
spillovers. A significant reduction in R&D activity would indeed be a cause for concern;
dismantled research networks are difficult to reconstruct.
Manufacturing R&D activity appears to have held its own after 2002, even as employment was
falling (Figure 10). R&D expenditures held constant until 2006 before falling slightly, but the
number of researchers working in the manufacturing sector continued to increase, even as total
employment fell. More generally, the manufacturing sector continued to invest in information
and communications technology (ITC) machinery and equipment, the sort of investment that is
most closely linked to technical progress. Indeed, since much of this capital equipment is
imported, the appreciation of the Canadian dollar made it easier for manufacturing firms to
increase their ITC holdings.
12 Krugman, Paul (1987). “The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive consequences of
Mrs Thatcher,” Journal of Development Economics 27: 41-55.
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FIGURE 10: R&D AND ITC CAPITAL STOCK: MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Data source: Cansim Tables 358−0024, 329−0057, 383−0025
The possibility that the manufacturing sector — or any sector — might be hollowed out as
R&D activity falls cannot be dismissed out of hand. However, the available data are not
consistent with this sort of collapse. R&D activity has not been significantly reduced, and
workers are making increased use of the latest technologies.
DUTCH THERAPY?
The 2002-2008 commodity price boom and exchange rate appreciation produced a
manufacturing sector that paid higher wages, that provided its workers with more and better
equipment and that had increased employment in R&D. If the real measure of an industry’s
health is its ability to create value and not in the size of its workforce, then the net result of
Dutch disease was a Canadian manufacturing sector that was healthier in 2008 than it was in
2002.
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